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RULE 35(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: BALANCING
THE INTERESTS UNDERLYING
SENTENCE REDUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Generally, a trial court has no authority to affect the execution of a
legal sentence beyond the term of court in which it is imposed.' Rule
35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule)2 provides an
exception to the general rule by permitting a court to "reduce a
sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.' 3 Rule 45(b) of
1. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1931); United States v.
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 768 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Krohn, 700 F.2d 1033,
1036 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir.
1975); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 918 (1968); United States ex rel. Quinn v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 644, 647 (7th Cir.
1947).
2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
3. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). The Rule provides:
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed or probation is revoked, or within 120 days after receipt by the
court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of
the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the
Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a
judgment of conviction or probation revocation. Changing a sentence from
a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a permis-
sible reduction of sentence under this subdivision.
Id.
When addressing the issue of jurisdiction under Rule 35(b), this Note deals with
the imposition of sentence as the event which commences the 120-day period. Revo-
cation of probation and receipt by the court of a mandate of affirmance of judgment
or dismissal of appeal also commence the time period under the Rule. Id.; see United
States v. Braasch, 542 F.2d 442, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1976).
The remedy provided by Rule 35(b) presupposes a valid conviction, see Poole v.
United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), and a
legally imposed sentence, see United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir.
1970); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). A Rule 35(b) motion essentially is a "plea for
leniency," Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1957), and is totally
within the discretion of the court. See, e.g., United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767,
771 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Colvin, 644 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. May-
nard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jones, 444 F.2d 89, 90 (2d
Cir. 1971); 8A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 35.02[3] (2d ed. 1983). The
motion may be summarily denied when the facts alleged do not indicate an illegal
sentence or gross abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. United States v. Nerren,
613 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1980). The scope of appellate review of district court
action on Rule 35(b) motions is narrow. An appellate court rarely will reduce a
sentence after a district court denial of such a motion. See McGee v. United States,
462 F.2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1972). A Rule 35(b) motion does not require a court
hearing. United States v. Krueger, 454 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1972).
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure4 prohibits a trial court from
extending this 120-day period and thus makes the time restriction in
Rule 35(b) jurisdictional. 5 Rule 35(b) is also considered remedial,
because it provides a validly convicted and legally sentenced defend-
ant the right to seek a reduction of sentence6 and affords the trial
judge a chance to reconsider the appropriateness of the original sen-
tence.7 The potential for abuse under the Rule is limited by restricting
trial court review to the fixed 120-day time period.8 These remedial
and jurisdictional policies underlying Rule 35(b) conflict when deter-
4. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b). Rule 45(b) states:
When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time,
the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or
without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is
made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done if the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but the court may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35, except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in them.
Id.
5. Id.; e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 & n.17 (1979);
United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1960); United States v. Kajevic, 711
F.2d 767, 768 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. DeMier, 671 F.2d 1200, 1205 (8th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Counter, 661 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Inendino, 655 F.2d 108, 109 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pollack, 655
F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 629 F.2d 1081,
1083 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1288
(4th Cir. 1975); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537,
541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968); United States ex rel. Quinn v.
Hunter, 162 F.2d 644, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1947).
6. See United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975); Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Second Preliminary Draft With Notes and Forms 132 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
Second Preliminary Draft]; Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft, With Notes and Forms 134
(1943) [hereinafter cited as First Preliminary Draft]; Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 6 N.Y.U. School of Law Inst. Proc. 107, 207 (1946) (remarks of G.
Dession, Advisory Committee member) [hereinafter cited as Institute Proceedings].
7. United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d
537, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968); see United States v. Mendoza,
565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (per curiam).
8. United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Gonzalez-Perez, 629 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289
(4th Cir. 1975); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 & n.6
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
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mining whether the filing of a motion for reduction of sentence within
the 120-day period satisfies the requirements of the Rule, or whether
court action is required within the 120-day period.
Although the language of the provision appears to require court
action within the time period, 9 federal courts have disagreed on the
issue. The majority of courts has interpreted Rule 35(b) liberally and
has determined that filing a motion to reduce sentence within the 120-
day period permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the case
for a reasonable period beyond the time limit. 10 Basing its analysis on
the principle of statutory construction that a statute should be con-
strued to avoid unreasonable or unintended consequences," the ma-
jority contends that requiring court action within the 120-day period
leads to arbitrary and unfair results.'2 In addition, Rule 2 of the
When Rule 35(b) was enacted in 1946, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons stated:
I think that [Rule 35] is a very healthy rule to limit the court in its change of
sentence to sixty days after the sentence was imposed. In the first place, it
protects the judge from continual importunities while the man is in the
institution. There is a rule to the effect that if the counsel for the defendant
files a petition for a reduction of sentence and that petition is not acted
upon, the judge can act on it any time, regardless of the expiration of the
term of court, and that has resulted in a good deal of importunities to thejudge. It amounts sometimes to a sort of bench parole, whereby the judge
retains the authority to reduce the sentence after the man has been commit-
ted.
Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 228 (statement of Bennett, J.).
9. See supra note 3.
10. United States v. Krohn, 700 F.2d 1033, 1035, 1038 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. DeMier, 671 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Smith,
650 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d
438, 442 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam); United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (5th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); United States
v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. United States
Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United
States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983, 985 n.32 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948
(1975); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 896 n.73 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1967);
Dodge v. Bennett, 335 F.2d 657, 659 (1st Cir. 1964) (dictum); see 8A J. Moore, supra
note 3, 35.02[2](a)(i); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 587, at 407
(2d ed. 1982).
11. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); see Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) ("If a literal construction of the
words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurd-
ity."); Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rule 35(b) liberally
construed so as to avoid unjust result), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); H. Black,
Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws § 29, at 66 (1911).
12. United States v. Krohn, 700 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983); see United
States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 13 which requires a "just deter-
mination of every criminal proceeding,' 1 4 indicates that a diligent
defendant should not be denied the right to sentence review due to
circumstances beyond his control.' 5 Consistent with this view, the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Advisory Committee) recently has proposed an
amendment to Rule 35(b) that would permit a trial court to retain
jurisdiction for a reasonable period of time upon the filing of a motion
within the 120-day period. 1
By contrast, a minority of courts has interpreted the provision more
narrowly and has determined that the sentencing court must act
within the 120-day period to meet the requirements of the Rule.' 7
v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287-89 (5th Cir.), reo'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89
(5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287,
1288-89 (4th Cir. 1975).
13. Fed. R. Crim. P. 2. The rule provides:
These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every
criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in proce-
dure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay.
Id.
14. Id.
15. See Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting United
States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d
89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); United
States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581
F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam). The term "diligent defendant" is used
in this Note to refer to the defendant who files well within the 120-day period, but
whose motion is not acted upon by the court before the period has expired.
16. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), 98 F.R.D. 381, 407 (1983) (Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendment). In proposing the amendment to Rule 35(b), the Advisory
Committee stated that its intention was to clarify any existing ambiguity in the Rule.
Id. advisory committee note.
Under §§ 3771-3772 of title 18 of the United States Code, Congress authorizes the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in criminal cases brought
in the United States District Courts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-3772 (1976). Rules promul-
gated under § 3771 deal with proceedings prior to or simultaneous with the verdict
and take effect ninety days after being reported to Congress unless Congress chooses
to reject them. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976). Rules prescribed pursuant to § 3772 deal
with proceedings after the verdict and take effect by order of the Supreme Court. 18
U.S.C. § 3772 (1976). The Advisory Committee is authorized to continually study
"the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or
hereafter in use" in the particular field. 98 F.R.D. at 389. Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee are submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States for evaluation. Id.
17. United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum); United
States v. Inendino, 655 F.2d 108, 109 (7th Cir. 1981) (dictum); United States v.
Pollack, 655 F.2d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum); United States ex rel. Quinn
v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 644, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1947) (dictum); see United States v.
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Basing its analysis on the legislative history of Rule 35(b) and the
Supreme Court's dicta in United States v. Addonizio,'8 which appears
to require court action within the 120-day period,1 9 the minority
contends that such a "court action" rule is necessary to fulfill the true
intent of the rule's drafters. 20
This Note examines the issue whether a court should retain jurisdic-
tion under Rule 35(b) after 120 days if a motion is filed within that
time. Part I discusses the historical background and legislative history
of Rule 35(b) and contends that the drafters contemplated court
action. Part II reviews the differing court interpretations of the time
limitation and suggests that a strict interpretation requiring court
action is consistent with the language and purpose of the statute and
provides the necessary judicial protection for a diligent defendant.
Part III examines the separation of powers issues raised by the major-
ity position and suggests that the Advisory Committee's recommenda-
tion does not satisfy the jurisdictional policies upon which Rule 35(b)
was based. The Note concludes that a motion-filing rule has merit,
but should be limited by another statutory period in which a trial
court must act in order to balance the two conflicting policies.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE 35(b)
Under traditional rules of statutory construction, when legislative
intent can be discerned from the language of a statute, a court is
required to apply the statute so as to fulfill that intent. 21 This is true
even though a particular court may view the statute as unwise or
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1290 (4th Cir. 1975) (Anderson, J., dissenting in part)
(agreeing with remedial policy of the majority's rule but disapproving of judicially
legislating change).
One court has suggested that Rule 35(a) establishes that the time limitation in Rule
35(b) refers solely to court action. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 769
(7th Cir. 1983). Rule 35(a) states that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at
any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided herein for the reduction of sentence." Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). If the drafters
of the Rules had not recognized that Rule 35(b) imposed a severe time limitation on
the authority of trial judges to act to reduce sentences, there would have been no
reason to include Rule 35(a) because illegal sentences could always be corrected
within a reasonable time under Rule 35(b). See 711 F.2d at 769.
18. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
19. See id. at 189 ("Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 35 now authorizes district courts to
reduce a sentence within 120 days after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed on
appeal.").
20. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 769-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum);
United States v. Inendino, 655 F.2d 108, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1981) (dictum); United
States v. Pollack, 655 F.2d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum); United States ex
rel. Quinn v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 644, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1947) (dictum).
21. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980); Huddleston v. United
States, 415 U.S. 814, 823, 828-29 (1974); Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S.
1983]
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unnecessary.22 If the application of the statute as written would lead
to an unreasonable, unintended or absurd result, courts generally
disregard the literal meaning of the words in interpreting the provi-
sion. 23 In such a circumstance, a court must review the legislative
history and purpose of the statute in order to determine the true intent
of the drafters.2 4
Courts generally agree that the plain meaning of Rule 35(b) re-
quires court action within the 120-day period.2 5 Courts, however,
disagree whether such a literal interpretation validly reflects the in-
tent of the drafters or leads to an unreasonable result.2 6 An examina-
tion of Rule 35(b)'s legislative history and its common-law predecessor
reveals that the appropriate interpretation of the Rule requires a more
restrictive construction than a motion-filing rule provides.
A. The Common-Law "Term-of-Court" Rule
At common law, a court could alter its judgments only during the
term of court in which they were rendered unless the proceeding for
392, 400 (1966) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,
543 (1940)); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892):
Thornley v. United States, 113 U.S. 310, 313 (1885); H. Black, supra note 11, § 68, at
196; Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
527, 533-34 (1947).
22. See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1960); Frankfurter,
supra note 21, at 533 ("Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making
might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration.").
23. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)); United States v.
Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288-90 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); see United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287,
1288 (4th Cir. 1975) ("We need not give [Rule 35(b)] so literal a reading, however,
and we can not assume that such a reading was intended [by the drafters] when the
consequences would be so devastatingly and arbitrarily fortuitous."); H. Black, supra
note 11, § 29, at 66 ("When the . . . literal import . . . would lead to absurd or
mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of
the legislature . . . it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disre-
garding or modifying ... the strict letter of the law.").
24. See United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1288 (4th Cir. 1975); Frankfurter, supra, note 21, at 541-
44.
25. E.g., United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Krohn, 700 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. DeMier, 671
F.2d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam);
United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975).
26. Compare United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288-90 (5th Cir.)
(unreasonable result could not have been intention of the drafters), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam) with United States v.
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an alteration had commenced during that term. 27 Prior to the enact-
ment of Rule 35(b), no other rule or statute authorized a district court
to reduce a valid sentence at any time after the term during which it
was imposed. 28 The term-of-court rule therefore developed as an at-
tempt to put a temporal limitation upon a court's interference in
otherwise final judgments.2 9 The rule sought to prevent the judiciary
from usurping the authority of the Parole Commission by limiting the
time a court had to review judgments and thus assuring that judg-
ments would become final and unalterable at a fixed point in time.30
The term-of-court rule, however, was not without its problems.
Blind adherence to the rule often resulted in arbitrary and unfair
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1983) (background and language of Rule plus
importance of having clear jurisdictional limits support court action rule).
27. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914); United States v. Krohn, 700
F.2d 1033, 1036 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289
(4th Cir. 1975). One court, however, has suggested that the term-of-court rule
limited the trial court to action within the term regardless of when the motion was
filed. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767-69 (7th Cir. 1983).
28. United States ex rel. Quinn v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 1947);
Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 207 (statement of C. Dession, Advisory
Committee member).
29. See Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 415 (1881) ("after the term has ended
all final judgments and decrees of the court pass beyond its control, unless steps be
taken during that term, by motion or otherwise, to set aside, modify, or correct
them"); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 167-68, 18 Wall. 11, 11 (1873) ("there must, in
the nature of the power thus exercised by the court, be in criminal cases some limit to
it"); Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. 488, 492, 12 Pet. 340, 343 (1838) ("[N]o
principle is better settled ... than that no court can reverse or annul its own final
decrees or judgments, for errors of fact or law, after the term in which they have
been rendered . . . from which it follows, that no change or modification can be
made, which may substantially vary or affect it in any material thing."). At one
time, a court could not grant probation to a defendant who had begun serving a term
of imprisonment. See Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79, 84 (1955); United States
v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358 (1928). In 1979, Rule 35(b) was amended to allow a
court to grant probation after the commencement of a term of imprisonment. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) & advisory committee note to 1979 amendment.
30. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-85 & n.1l (1979) (finality
concept fosters confidence in judicial procedures and orderly court administration);
see supra note 29. In United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), the Supreme Court
held that a reduction of sentence "alters the terms of the judgment . . . and is a
judicial act as much as the imposition of the sentence." Id. at 311. Furthermore, it is
not "a usurpation of the pardoning power of the executive." Id. This does not,
however, address the question whether retaining control over a Rule 35(b) motion
pending a possible early release by the Parole Commission is an infringement of the
legislative delegation of early release determination to the executive branch. See infra
notes 111-20 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's holding that a judge has
no enforceable sentencing expectations with regard to the actual release of a prisoner
short of the statutory term suggests that the use of Rule 35(b) to achieve such a result
may be in contravention of its proper meaning. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 187-90 (1979).
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consequences to a defendant. 31 For example, a defendant sentenced at
the beginning of a court's term had longer to prepare a motion to
reduce sentence than did a defendant sentenced on the last day of the
court term. 32
In order to mitigate these unfair consequences to the defendant, the
Supreme Court adopted a rule that allowed district courts to retain
control over their judgments beyond their respective court terms. 33
Under the rule, a district court had up to 90 days beyond its term to
change the conditions of a valid sentence. 34 Each district court deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis whether to use the 90-day extension. 35
As a result, the time for sentence review varied considerably between
districts and between cases within a particular district. 36
This lack of consistency was much criticized. When the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were formulated, the term-of-court rule
was eliminated as a time constraint in criminal proceedings. 37 The
drafters indicated, however, that in eliminating the term-of-court rule
from criminal proceedings, they had no intention of substituting in-
definiteness. 38 For this reason, the drafters included fixed time periods
for certain procedures under the new rules and made the time periods
jurisdictional in nature. 39
B. Legislative History of Rule 35(b)
Sensitive to the inequities caused by the term-of-court rule and the
continued need to limit the time within which a court could grant a
31. E.g., United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (5th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1288 (4th Cir. 1975); see Dodge v. Bennett, 335 F.2d 657,
658 (1st Cir. 1964) (dictum).
32. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975).
33. See Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 211, 225 (statements of Mr.
Chapman and C. Dession, Advisory Committee members).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 225-26, 228 (statement of Holtzoff, J., Advisory Committee mem-
ber).
36. See id.; Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(c) advisory committee note.
37. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(c), H.R. 12, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1945). The rule
stated that "the period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any
proceeding is not affected or limited by the expiration of a term of court. The
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act in a
criminal proceeding." Id.
38. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 226 (1960); United States v. Smith,
331 U.S. 469, 473-74 & n.2 (1947); Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(c) advisory committee note
(specific time limitations substituted for term-of-court rule); Second Preliminary
Draft, supra note 6, at 132 (Committee Note).
39. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b) (court may not extend specific time periods appearing
in Rule 35 unless so stated in that rule); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee
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reduction of sentence, Congress enacted Rule 35(b) providing for a 60-
day time limitation on court action. 40 The drafters explained that the
purpose of the 60-day rule was to replace the flexible term-of-court
rule with a specific time limitation on court action.41 By doing so,
several important objectives could be satisfied: such a requirement
would limit the time within which a court could exercise control over
its judgments, 42 reduce the potential for court infringment on Parole
Commission authority over release determinations, 43 and eliminate
the overloading of court dockets with superfluous Rule 35(b) mo-
tions.
44
Under this 60-day rule, the time within which a court could reduce
a sentence was still limited. By imposing a fixed time period that
commenced for each defendant when his sentence was imposed, how-
ever, the new rule avoided the arbitrary results caused by the com-
mon-law practice. 45 Under Rule 35(b), no matter how long the term
of court extended, a court lost control over a judgment once the
statutory time period had passed.46 Each defendant, however, had the
same 60 days in which to seek a reduction of sentence.47
note; see Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 207, 211, 224-27 (statements of G.
Dession and Holtzoff, J., Advisory Committee members) (court is powerless to act
after expiration of time period).
40. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, 327 U.S. 821, 856 (1946) ("The court may reduce a
sentence within 60 days after the sentence is imposed .... ); see United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d
537, 543 (2d Cir.) (purpose to give every convicted defendant a second chance before
the sentencing judge), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968); Second Preliminary Draft,
supra note 6, at 132 (60-day time limitation affords defendant sentenced at the end of
the court term same time to seek mitigation as a defendant sentenced at the begin-
ning of the court term); Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 225 (statement of
Holtzoff, J., Advisory Committee member).
41. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee note; Institute Proceedings, supra
note 6, at 211, 224-25 (statement of G. Dession, Advisory Committee member).
42. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 & n.11 (1979); Sotto v.
Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980);
Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 225 (statement of G. Dession, Advisory
Committee member).
43. Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 228 (statement of Bennett, J.) (term-
of-court rule resulted in "a sort of bench parole").
44. See Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 228 (1946) (statement of Bennett,
J.) (time limitation protects judge from repeated requests for sentence reductions).
45. Id. at 225 (statement of Holtzoff,-J., Advisory Committee member).
46. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, 327 U.S. 825, 856 (1946); Institute Proceedings, supra
note 6, at 224-26 (statements of G. Dession and Holtzoff, J., Advisory Committee
members); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee note (court power to reduce
sentence circumscribed by specific time limitation and not by term of court).
47. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, 327 U.S. 825, 856 (1946).
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Rule 35(b) went through several drafts before it was enacted. 48 A
comparison of the initial draft and the enacted version suggests that
the drafters intended the Rule to require court action within the 60-
day period, rather than motion filing within that period. The First
Preliminary Draft stated that "[tihe court may reduce a sentence
without regard to whether the term of court at which the sentence
was imposed has expired upon motion made within 60 days after
sentence."' 49 In all subsequent drafts and in its final form, however,
the motion filing language was eliminated.50
The elimination of the motion requirement from the Rule as en-
acted suggests that the drafters rejected linking the Rule to motion
filing because motion filing would permit a court to delay action for
an extended period and thus would not accomplish the objectives
underlying the imposition of a time limitation on Rule 35(b) proceed-
ings.51 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in other contexts, has stated
that the appearance of a requirement in a draft of a statutory provi-
sion and its elimination in all subsequent drafts is almost conclusive
proof that the drafters intended it to be absent in its enacted form. 52
48. Second Preliminary Draft, supra note 6, at 129; First Preliminary Draft,
supra note 6, at 152; 5 L. Orfield, Criminal Procedure under the Federal Rules
§ 35:4, at 464-68 (1967).
49. First Preliminary Draft, supra note 6, at 134 (emphasis added).
50. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); Second Preliminary Draft, supra note 6, at 132; 5
L. Orfield, supra note 49, § 35:4, at 467.
51. See Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 207, 211, 224-25 (statement of G.
Dession, Advisory Committee member). It was believed that such language would
lead to unfettered discretion by trial courts. See United States v. Inendino, 655 F.2d
108, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 629 F.2d 1081, 1083
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir.
1975); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at 207 (statement of
C. Dession, Advisory Committee member) ("[A] time limit of sixty days was imposed
in order that there might be some limit in the event of a very extended term of the
court."). During the Institute Proceedings, in response to a question whether a court
retained control over its judgments after the expiration of the 60 days, Professor
Dession stated that "[t]he commentary of the second preliminary draft expressly
mentioned that practice and pointed out that this Rule, the 60-day limit, would
preclude that." Id. at 225. Motion-filing language was also thought to lead to
usurpation of the Parole Commission's authority over release determination. See
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 n.15 (1979); Bradley v. United States,
410 U.S. 605, 611 n.6 (1973); United States v. Inendino, 655 F.2d 108, 109 (7th Cir.
1981); United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975); Institute Proceedings, supra note 6, at
228 (statement of Bennett, J.) (time limitation of court action requirement guards
against bench parole by sentencing court); 5 L. Orfield, supra note 49, § 35:4, at 465-
66 (Parole Board is the proper authority from which to seek relief after affirmance on
appeal).
52. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 228 (1960); see, e.g., Blau v.
Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-12 (1962); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222-24 (1952); Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430, 436-37 (1916).
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Thus, the presence of a motion filing rule in the earlier draft and its
elimination from enacted Rule 35(b) is strong evidence that the draft-
ers intended jurisdiction to depend on court action within the pre-
scribed time and not on a timely filed motion.
The 1966 amendment to Rule 35(b) further suggests that the draft-
ers intended the time limitation to link the Rule to court action and
not motion filing.5 3 The Rule was amended to increase the time
limitation from 60 days to 120 days in order to permit a defendant a
greater amount of time to collect and file the papers necessary to
properly support a reduction in sentence plea.5 4 In explaining the
reason for increasing the time period, an advisory committee note
stated that "[t]he 60-day period is frequently too short to enable the
defendant to obtain and file the evidence ... [and] may result in the
60-day period passing before the court is able to consider the case."'5 5
The language suggests that the Advisory Committee considered the
time period to be linked to court action and not motion filing.
Even though the plain language of the Rule and some of the legisla-
tive history suggest that the time limitation should be applied to court
action, the First Preliminary Draft also may be interpreted as demon-
strating the original intent of the drafters to link the Rule to motion
filing. While the motion filing language was later deleted, such a rule
nonetheless is consistent with the policy of affording a trial court a
reasonable amount of time to reduce a sentence that it had originally
imposed.56 The 1966 amendment further suggests that the drafters
were concerned with making the time constraints ample to avoid loss
of jurisdiction due to lack of sufficient time within which to file a
properly supported motion under Rule 35(b).5 7 In light of this con-
cern, it would appear inconsistent to deny a defendant the remedy
under Rule 35(b) on the basis of a court's inability to review the
motion within the allotted time. Moreover, the Advisory Committee's
53. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (1966 amendment); id. advisory committee note.
54. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (1966 amendment); id. advisory committee note.
55. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee note to 1966 amendment (emphasis
added); United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 769 (7th Cir. 1983) (1966 amend-
ment suggests drafters intended a court action rule); United States v. Mendoza, 565
F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir.) ("The 1966 amendment ... was accompanied by an
Advisory Committee Note which... suggests that the 120 day period was intended
as a limit upon the time within which the court may act."), rev'd on other grounds,
581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
56. United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285,
1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per
curiam); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968).
57. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee note to 1966 amendment.
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recent proposal to amend Rule 35(b) is expressly intended to conform
"[the Rule's] language to the nonliteral interpretation which courts
have already placed upon the rule. '58 Thus, while it is arguable that
the drafters originally intended to require court action within the
prescribed time, revisionists now believe that a motion-filing rule
should be sufficient for a court to retain jurisdiction. 59 To clarify the
inadequacy of the Advisory Committee's proposal, it is necessary to
analyze the various court interpretations of Rule 35(b) and the policies
upon which they are based.
II. CONFLICTING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND
INTERPRETATIONS OF RULE 35(b)
When a court does not act within the 120-day time period, a literal
application of the Rule results in a loss of the trial court's jurisdic-
tion. 60 This loss of jurisdiction may deprive certain defendants of relief
under Rule 35(b) through no fault of their own.6' If a defendant files
his Rule 35(b) motion beyond the 120-day period, or within the period
but close to its expiration, loss of jurisdiction may be considered as
much the fault of the defendant as of a strict interpretation .62 If a
defendant files his motion papers well within the 120 days, however,
and the court then fails to act on it before the 120 days pass, a strict
interpretation of the Rule produces an inequitable result. 3 In this
instance, the supporters of a motion filing interpretation for Rule
35(b) argue that the remedial and jurisdictional policies underlying
58. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), 98 F.R.D. 381, 407 (1983) (Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendment) (advisory committee note).
59. See id.
60. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962
(1975).
61. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); Dodge v. Bennett, 335
F.2d 657, 658 (1st Cir. 1964); see Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714, 719 (9th
Cir. 1967).
62. United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Inendino, 655 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1981); see United States v. Regan, 503 F.2d
234, 236-37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1006 (1974); United States v. Mehrtens,
494 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). One court,
however, has held that when a court or a governmental agent misleads the defendant
or his attorney, a late filing will not deny the court jurisdiction to consider a Rule 35
motion. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 438, 442 (3d Cir.
1979).
63. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); see United States v.
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Rule 35(b) conflict significantly.6 4 Courts construing Rule 35(b) have
differed over which policies should take precedence.6 5
A. Remedial Policies Require a Liberal
Construction- The Majority View
A majority of courts interpreting Rule 35(b) has determined that
the objectives of the Rule are best served by a construction that
permits the filing of a motion within the 120-day period to confer
jurisdiction on the trial court. 66 While the plain language of the Rule
appears to require timely court action,6 7 these courts suggest that such
a narrow construction would lead to an unreasonable interpretation
inconsistent with the intent of the Rule.6 8 The remedial purpose of the
Rule is to give the defendant "a second round before the sentencing
judge"6' 9 and to give the sentencing judge "an opportunity to recon-
sider the sentence in light of any further information about the de-
fendant or the case."'70 A strict construction requiring court action
within the 120-day period often produces inequitable results and cir-
cumvents this stated purpose.71 For example, if a defendant files a
motion for a reduction of sentence well within the 120-day period and
the trial court fails to consider it within the allotted time, the defend-
ant is deprived of the Rule 35(b) privilege through no fault of his
own.
72
64. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1290, 1294 (5th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam).
65. Compare United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (dic-
tum) (minority view) with United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.)
(majority view), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per
curiam); and United States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1975); and
United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 509 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 962 (1975); and United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968).
66. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
68. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1288 (4th Cir. 1975); see United States v. United States
Dist. Ct., 509 F. 2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
69. United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 918 (1968); see United States v. Rice, 671 F.2d 455, 459 (11th Cir. 1982).
70. United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 918 (1968); accord United States v. Colvin, 644 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1981)
(quoting United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d at 543); United States v. Morales, 498
F. Supp. 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Erickson, 300 F. Supp. 1236,
1240 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
71. See supra notes 62, 64, 69 and accompanying text.
72. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1287, 1294 (5th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); see Leyvas v.
United States, 371 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1967); see supra notes 62, 64 and accom-
panying text.
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In addition, Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that the rules "are intended to provide for the just determina-
tion of every criminal proceeding."' 73 A strict construction of Rule
35(b) may subvert the general purpose of the rules in that defendants
may be unfairly deprived of the privilege of sentence review. 74 More-
over, the Supreme Court, in other contexts, has determined that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are not to be rigidly applied
without considering the circumstances surrounding the specific situa-
tion.7 5
The majority position, however, is not entirely sound. The diligent
defendant need not be unfairly treated under a strict construction of
the Rule. For example, even if a trial judge is unavailable or so
overloaded that he is unable to consider the defendant's motion within
the 120-day time period, courts have held that any judge within the
particular court may be substituted for the sentencing judge. 78 More-
over, even if a truly ill-intentioned judge purposely chose to delay
decision on a timely motion until the 120-day period had passed, it
does not necessarily follow that the defendant would be unfairly
deprived of sentence review. 77 Rule 35(b) motions are reviewable on
appeal and reversible on a showing of gross abuse of judicial discre-
tion.78 In addition, a trial judge bent upon such a course may accom-
plish the same result even under a liberal reading of the Rule by
expressly denying the motion.79
73. Fed. R. Crim. P. 2.
74. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1286-87 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v.
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1288-89 (4th Cir. 1975).
75. Berman v. United States, 378 U.S. 530, 538 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting);
United States v. Fallen, 378 U.S. 139, 144 (1964); see also United States v. Mendoza,
565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en bane) (per curiam); United States v. Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Claus, 5 F.R.D. 278, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). But see 8 J. Moore,
supra, note 3, § 2.02, at 1 n.1 (Rule 2 tends to be used as a "makeweight" by the
courts).
76. E.g., United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Dobson, 609 F.2d 840, 843 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980);
Tully v. Scheu, 487 F. Supp. 404, 409 (D.N.J.), rev'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 917
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981). In practice, however, this alterna-
tive may not protect the defendant in such circumstances because a substituted judge
may give deference to the sentence originally imposed by the trial judge.
77. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); see United States v. Hetrick, 644 F.2d 752, 754-55
(9th Cir. 1980) (denials of reduction of sentence motions are reviewable): United
States v. Kouwenhoven, 602 F.2d 234, 238 (9th Cir. 1979) (denial of reduction of
sentence motion may be reversed on appeal for clear showing of abuse of discretion);
United States v. Stumpf, 476 F.2d 945, 946 (4th Cir. 1973) (same); Taylor v. United
States, 456 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972).
79. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Reliance upon Rule 2 also may be misplaced. While the majority
asserts that the diligent defendant faced with the situations above
would be denied a "just determination" under a court action interpre-
tation, the appellate process and the ability to substitute for the trial
judge under Rule 35(b) are alternatives available to defendant.8 0 A
"just determination of every criminal proceeding""' thus may be possi-
ble even under a literal reading of Rule 35(b).
In addition, the second sentence of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure instructs that the rules "shall be construed to
secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."8' 2 To read a timely
motion requirement into Rule 35(b) may have the reverse effect.
Court dockets could clog with extended court determinations of what
constitutes a reasonable time beyond the 120-day period. 3
While these criticisms cannot be considered dispositive of the effec-
tiveness of a motion-filing rule, the majority view nonetheless does not
adequately balance the interests underlying Rule 35(b). Under a mo-
tion-filing rule, the jurisdictional policies underlying Rule 35(b) are
neglected because a court is permitted to retain jurisdiction over a case
for an extended period. The majority's reliance upon the remedial
policies underlying Rule 35(b) therefore may be unjustified, consider-
ing the alternative jurisdictional policies upon which the Rule is
based.
B. Strict Construction and the Court
Action Rule-the Minority View
A minority of courts considering Rule 35(b) has determined that a
strict construction requiring court action within the 120-day time
period best satisfies the intent of the drafters.8 4 These courts base their
analysis on the plain language of the provision and the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Addonizio. 5
80. Id.
81. Fed. R. Grim. P. 2.
82. Id.
83. See United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam); Institute Proceedings,
supra note 6, at 228 (statement of Bennett, J.). Moreover, under the majority view
more cases would have to be heard on appeal to determine if a court acted within a
"reasonable time." 565 F.2d at 1290-91; accord United States v. Cole, 588 F.2d 56,
60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 909 (1978).
84. United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum);
United States v. Inendino, 655 F.2d 108, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1981) (dictum); United
States v. Pollack, 655 F.2d 243, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum); United States ex
rel. Quinn v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 644, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1947) (dictum).
85. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
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The Court in Addonizio addressed the issue whether a post-sentenc-
ing change in Parole Commission guidelines that frustrates the expec-
tations of a sentencing judge is "sufficiently fundamental" 86 to allow
collateral relief under the federal habeas corpus provision. 7 In Ad-
donizio, the trial judge imposed a ten-year sentence based on an
expectation that defendant's good behavior in prison would lead to an
early release by the Parole Commission."8 Subsequent to the sentenc-
ing, the Parole Commission adopted new parole guidelines that effec-
tively eliminated defendant's chances for early release.89 In reviewing
the possibility for resentencing under the provision, the Court held
that a judge has no enforceable expectations as to the actual date that
a prisoner is to be released. 90 In fact, a search for the "subjective intent
of the judge at the time of sentencing"9' would undermine the legisla-
ture's decision to entrust early release determinations to the Parole
Commission, which "is in the best position to determine when release
is appropriate. ' 92 In arriving at its decision, the Court stated:
The authority of sentencing judges to select precise release dates is
... narrowly limited: the judge may select an early parole eligibil-
ity date, but that guarantees only that the defendant will be consid-
ered at that time by the Parole Commission. And once a sentence
has been imposed, the trial judge's authority to modify it is also
circumscribed. Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 35 now authorizes district
courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days after it is imposed....
The time period, however, is jurisdictional and may not be ex-
tended.9 3
The Court's discussion of Rule 35(b) is an integral part of the
minority's rationale. If Rule 35(b)'s time limitation was meant to limit
motion filing and not court action, the enforcement of a sentencing
judge's expectation as to the release date of a convicted defendant
would be possible under the Rule.94 Such a result would appear to be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's language in Addonizio.9 5
Moreover, the Court in a series of cases spanning the life of Rule
35(b) has consistently interpreted similar time limitations, made juris-
dictional by Rule 45(b), as limiting court action.96 For example, fol-
86. Id. at 185.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
88. 442 U.S. at 180-81.
89. Id. at 182 & n.4.
90. Id. at 190.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. at 189.
93. Id. (footnotes omitted).
94. See United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 769-70 (7th Cir. 1983).
95. Id. at 770; see United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 190 (1979).
96. See, e.g., Berman v. United States, 378 U.S. 530, 530 (1964) (per curiam);
United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 226 (1960); United States v. Smith, 331
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lowing the enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1947, the Court in United States v. Smith97 considered whether a
federal district court has the authority to order a new trial on its own
motion under Rule 33 after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal.98
Rule 33 permits a court to grant a defendant a new trial in the
interests of justice and requires a defendant to file a motion for a new
trial within five days of the verdict for requests on any other
grounds. 9 The Supreme Court agreed that a literal reading of Rule 33
made the five-day period applicable only to a defendant's motion and
did not limit court action under the rule. 00 It further acknowledged
that if applied literally, a federal district court "would [have the]
power ... to grant new trials on its own motion. . . indefinitely.''0
The Court held that such a construction would be unacceptable and
therefore construed the rule so as to make the time limitation applica-
ble to motions both by the court and defendant. 0 2
In United States v. Robinson,10 3 the Court held that the time limita-
tion in Rule 37(a),' 10 4 which permitted a defendant to file an appeal
within ten days after the entry of judgment, was jurisdictional and
could not be enlarged.10 5 The Court thus reaffirmed its commitment
to the limitation of a district court's power over its own judgments.10
In discussing Rule 37(a), the Court stated that the same circumscrip-
tion of court action applied to Rule 35. 107
The case law cited by the minority, however, is questionable sup-
port for its position. Because Addonizio did not directly address the
issue of jurisdiction under Rule 35(b), other courts have concluded
that the Supreme Court was merely restating the proposition that
Rule 35(b)'s time limitation is jurisdictional and was not attempting to
require court action within the time period. 10 The Advisory Commit-
tee's proposal is also intended "to remove any doubt which might arise
from dictum in . . . Addonizio."'109 A strict construction requiring
U.S. 469, 475 (1947). But cf. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 144 (1964) (court
relaxed rule due to exigent circumstances).
97. 331 U.S. 469 (1947).
98. Id. at 471; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, 327 U.S. 821, 855-56 (1946).
99. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, 327 U.S. 825 (1946).
100. See Smith, 331 U.S. at 473-75.
101. Id. at 473-74.
102. Id. at 475.
103. 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
104. Fed. R. Crim. P. 37(a), 327 U.S. 825, 857-58 (1946).
105. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 224.
106. See id. at 225-26, 229.
107. Id. at 225-26.
108. United States v. Krohn, 700 F.2d 1033, 1036-38 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. DeMier, 671 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1982).
109. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), 98 F.R.D. 381, 407 (1983) (Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendment) (advisory committee note).
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court action within the 120-day period therefore may not adequately
provide a judge with additional time to review the motion and allow
the defendant a proper chance for review.
III. A PROPOSAL: MAINTAINING A SEPARATION OF POWERS
The issue whether to link Rule 35(b)'s time limitation to court
action or motion filing is based primarily on a choice between the
Rule's remedial and jurisdictional policies. 110 The majority's decision
to link district court jurisdiction to timely motion filing appears to be
inconsistent not only with the plain language of the rule, but also with
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers."' Although the
doctrine of separation of powers does not require absolute departmen-
tal autonomy,"12 it does require that duties specifically delegated to
one branch of government not be willfully usurped by another
branch."3 Because Congress has determined that the Parole Commis-
sion is in the best position to determine whether a validly convicted
defendant is ready for conditional release, " 4 permitting trial judges to
systematically rule on timely filed reduction of sentence motions be-
yond the 120-day period may infringe on the Parole Commission's
exercise of discretion and circumvent congressional intent." 5 Because
the Parole Commission is an executive agency, 11 such an infringement
would constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. " 7 In
110. United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1288-90 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam).
111. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982) ("a court should
not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent with
that intent"); The Federalist, No. 78, at 396 (A. Hamilton) (G. Wills ed. 1982) ("It
can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretence of a repugnancy, may
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature."); cf.
Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 192 (5th Cir. 1979) (in construing a state rule
similar to Rule 35(b) court stated that a tripartite scheme of government requires
eventual ending of judicial power to reduce sentence and final vesting in executive
branch), cert. denied., 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
112. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
113. See id. at 121-22 (1976); The Federalist, No. 78, at 393-94 (A. Hamilton) (G.
Wills ed. 1982) at 393-94.
114. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188, 189 nn.13 & 14 (1978);
United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1983).
115. United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 770-72 (7th Cir. 1983); see United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89 & nn.13 & 15 (1979) (dictum) (congressio-
nal intent was to delegate early release determination to the Parole Commission.).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1976).
117. The separation of powers doctrine guards against the unnecessary accumula-
tion of power in a single governmental body, Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th
Cir. 1980), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), and attempts to increase governmental
efficiency by allocating specific duties to governmental departments which are best
suited to perform those duties, id. at 423. Violation of the doctrine occurs when there
is "an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential to the
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addition, the majority's analysis of Rule 35(b) is arguably inconsistent
with the Rule's plain language and the drafters' original intent and
may infringe on the rule-making authority of Congress and the Su-
preme Court. 18 The Supreme Court has stated that regardless of how
admirable or desirable a particular legislative policy may be, a court
may not implement such a policy by judicially changing the meaning
of an otherwise unambiguous rule. " 9 The only appropriate method to
implement such a policy is the rule-making and amendment proc-
ess. 1
20
operation of a coordinate branch, provided also that the assumption disrupts the
coordinate branch in the performance of its duties," id. at 425, and is not required to
further a legitimate governmental interest, id.
Responsibility for criminal release is divided among the three branches of the
federal government. Edwards v. United States, 574 F.2d 937, 941 (8th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978). Congress determines which acts are to be considered
criminal acts, United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971), and the range of
sentencing options, Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82-83 (1955). The judiciary
determines the need for imprisonment and selects the appropriate punishment for the
defendant within the range of congressionally prescribed punishments. Joost v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 535 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Kan. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 698 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Through the Parole Commis-
sion, the executive branch determines the amount of the sentence the defendant must
actually serve in prison. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4218 (1976).
Congress has determined that the Parole Commission is in the best position to
grant early release to a prisoner. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89 &
n.14 (1979); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1927). While Congress'
delegation of early release determination to the Parole Commission does not usurp
the power of the sentencing judge to designate the maximum and minimum periods
of incarceration for defendants, Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1023 (1982); Page v. United States Parole Comm'n, 651 F.2d
1083, 1085 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), a sentencing court that attempts to set a
specific parole date for a defendant does interfere with the functions of the Parole
Commission, United States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1981); Hawkins
v. United States Parole Comm'n, 511 F. Supp. 460, 461 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 679
F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1982). Permitting a trial judge to delay action on a Rule 35(b)
motion after the expiration of the 120-day period, with the likely effect of assuming
the function of the Parole Commission, is a misuse of the remedy. United States v.
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1983). Such action would encroach upon the
Commission's authority over early release determination.
118. See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1960) (construing Fed.
R. Crim. P. 37(a), 327 U.S. 825 (1946)).
119. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1960); see United States v.
Janitz, 6 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1946); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 67.10, at 237 (4th ed. 1974).
120. United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir.) (Wyzanski, J., concurring) ("We have no
authority to legislate."), rev'd on other grounds, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1290 (4th Cir. 1975) (Anderson, J., dissenting in
part) ("While I agree with the remedial purpose underlying the majority's decision, it
is my opinion that this should be brought about by an amendment to Rule 35 ...
and not through a ruling by a federal court.").
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Because there are strong indications that the plain language of Rule
35(b)'s time limitation accurately reflects its true meaning,' 2 1 to per-
mit an alternative judicial interpretation would be to condone judicial
infringement on the legislative function. Congress and the Supreme
Court therefore should respond to this continuing disagreement by
amending the Rule to harmonize both sets of policies. While judicial
discussion of Rule 35(b) has continued unabated since its adoption,122
few jurists or commentators have attempted to devise a method
whereby court power over judgments of conviction may be limited
without causing undue hardship to diligent defendants.
The Advisory Committee's proposal to amend Rule 35(b) merely
adopts the majority analysis and does not adequately balance the
various interests involved. 123 While a motion filing rule does have
merit because it adequately deals with the remedial interests underly-
ing the Rule, it ignores the jurisdictional aspects of the Rule by leaving
the time for court action dependent upon the trial court's determina-
tion of a "reasonable time." Such a standard would lead to extended
court determinations which could vary among courts. The plain lan-
guage of the Rule and its legislative history suggest that greater weight
should be given to limiting the time for court determination.
Two alternative proposals appear to balance these interests. Under
each of these proposals, it should be the responsibility of the defend-
ant's attorney to see that the trial court acts, or if the court willfully
refuses to act, to bring an appeal for abuse of discretion. Defendant's
normal procedural safeguards and access to appellate review should
assure him of a fair disposition of his case. 2 4
121. See supra notes 51-55, 84-107.
122. See supra notes 10, 17.
123. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), 98 F.R.D. 381, 407 (1983) (Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendment) (advisory committee note).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). A defendant may appeal the denial of a Rule
35(b) motion. United States v. Shillingford, 586 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1978); 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), however, the scope of review has been quite narrow. United
States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1983); Government of Virgin Islands v.
Gereau, 603 F.2d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 1979). In certain instances, however, appellate
review. has expanded. See, e.g., United States v. Stumpf, 476 F.2d 945, 946-47 (4th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (appellate court will review when there is abuse of discre-
tion); United States v. McCord, 466 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1972) (growing precedent
for review when it is clear that district court has abused its discretion); McGee v.
United States, 462 F.2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1972) (appellate court will scrutinize
information considered by trial courts). If a Rule 35(b) motion is no longer available
to defendant and he has exhausted all avenues of direct appeal and collateral attack,
he may seek executive clemency, see Egan v. United States, 268 F.2d 820, 824 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 868 (1959), or have his sentence reduced on motion of
the Bureau of Prisons, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (1976).
The simplest way to amend the Rule would be to emulate the 1966 amendment by
increasing the 120-day time period and clarifying the need for court action within
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One approach would be to require a defendant to file a motion
within some fixed period commencing upon the imposition of sentence
and to require court action within a longer fixed period also com-
mencing upon imposition of sentence.125 This alternative would en-
courage defendants to file early and ensure sufficient time for courts to
decide such motions. It also would eliminate the situation presented
when a defendant files on the 119th day of the time period, making
court action within the prescribed time virtually impossible. Further-
more, it would specifically limit court action to a definite time and
thus decrease the potential for infringement of Parole Commission
authority inherent in the Advisory Committee's position.
A second alternative would also require a defendant to file a Rule
35(b) motion within a specific time period, and would grant the court
a specific time within which to act upon the motion. The court action
period, however, would begin to run upon the filing of the motion
with the court clerk. This alternative is preferable because it would
minimize the danger that a trial court could manipulate the Rule and
infringe upon the Parole Commission's authority. At the same time, it
would protect the diligent defendant from being unjustly deprived of
a second chance to appear before the sentencing court by commencing
the time period for court action upon the filing of a motion. This
alternative appears to be consistent with the original purpose of the
Rule and affords defendants a fair opportunity to take advantage of
the remedy provided in Rule 35(b). It would both provide ample time
for the filing of a motion and require expedience in court determina-
tion. Consequently, it appears to be preferable to the Advisory Com-
mittee's approach.
that time period. This would allow a defendant more time to prepare and file
evidence in support of a reduction of sentence motion and the trial court would have
more time to consider its merit. One commentator has recommended that the period
be increased to 180 days to coincide with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976),
which provides that a trial judge may suspend the imposition or execution of a
sentence within 180 days of imposition of judgment. C. Renfrew, Sentence Review
by the Trial Court; A Proposal to Amend Rule 35, 51 Ind. L.J. 355, 364 & n.35
(1976). While such a proposal does attempt to balance the remedial and jurisdic-
tional policies involved, it does not appear to be an ultimate solution. It would
appear inequitable because it does not eliminate the problem of a defendant filing a
motion for sentence reduction near the end of the time period, making it difficult for
the court to act. Id. at 361, 364 & n.36.
125. This was the general scheme proposed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Mendoza, 565 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1978), and disapproved by the Fifth
Circuit sitting en bane. United States v. Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en bane) (per curiam). The court suggested that the defendant be allowed to file at
any time within the 120 days and the court be allowed to go beyond the 120 days only
if the defendant filed within the first 60 days. 565 F.2d at 1291-92. If the defendant
filed within the first 60 days, the court could take a reasonable time beyond the
period to act. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Advisory Committee's proposal to permit a trial court to retain
jurisdiction for a reasonable time upon the filing of a motion within
the 120-day period has merit because it is consistent with the remedial
purpose of Rule 35(b). By allowing judicial determination of a reason-
able time after expiration of the 120-day period, however, the Advi-
sory Committee's amendment will lead to inconsistent decisions
among the circuits and to more crowded court dockets. Such a rule
does not adequately balance the remedial and jurisdictional policies
underlying Rule 35(b). Congress and the Supreme Court therefore
should amend the Rule to balance these interests and prevent judicial
usurpation of legislative and executive functions. *
B. Carole Hoffman
• At the time this Note went to press, the Fourth Circuit followed United States
v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir. 1975) and held that because "the trial judge
purposely delayed consideration of the motion until after the deadline in order to
review the Parole Commission's decision," the delay was "unreasonable" and the
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Rule 35(b) motion. United States v. Schafer,
No. 83-6119, slip op. at 4-5 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1984).
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